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A
s this is the inaugural conference of the
International Society for Equity in Health,I
thought it would be an appropriate occa-
sion to reﬂect on some foundational questions in
my keynote address. Why are we concerned with
equity in health, and what is its relation to equity
in general? Should we be more concerned about
inequalities in health than about inequalities in
other dimensions such as income? Should we be
more concerned with some types of health
inequalities than with others? Should we be less
tolerant of inequalities across certain population
groups than across others? Attempting to answer
these questions might help sharpen our under-
standing of the special priority we accord to com-
bating inequalities in health.
Let me start with the welfare-economic ap-
proach to assessing the distribution of a good—
for simplicity, let us call this good “income”. A
positive value attaches to higher total or average
income, and a negative value to inequality of
incomes around the average. The trade off
between these two attributes of the
distribution—sometimes labelled “efﬁciency”
and “equity” by economists—is inferred from the
society’s social welfare function, which explicitly
incorporates its distributional values.
I think it makes much sense to treat the distri-
bution of health outcomes in a similar fashion.
More aggregate or average health is positively
valued as a good thing, and inequality of health
around the average is negatively valued as a bad
thing. Again there is a normative trade off where
we might,if necessary,be willing to sacriﬁce some
aggregate health for more equality of health. Of
course, in particular empirical situations we may
not be faced with a trade off:there may be policies
that permit the achievement of both a higher
average and more equality.
As a matter of valuation, however, we do need
to acknowledge the existence of a trade off. As
health egalitarians, we should not be evaluating
health distributions solely in terms of inequality
and without regard to the average. Consider a
distribution of two groups of equal size, each of
which has a life expectancy at birth of 50
years—so there is perfect equality in health
achievement of the two groups.Now suppose that
one group’s life expectancy increases to 55 years
while the other group’s life expectancy increases
to 65 years. In the new situation, average life
expectancy has gone up from 50 to 60 years, but
there is inequality now in health achievement
between the two groups. Much as we might be
concerned with health inequality, it would be dif-
ﬁcult for us to judge the old situation of a 50 year
life expectancy for each group as better than the
new situation of a 55 year life expectancy for one
group and a 65 year life expectancy for the other.
Of course,what egalitarians would prefer is a dis-
tribution with an average life expectancy of 60
years where both groups have the same life
expectancy of 60 years, instead of one having 55
and the other 65 years. Compared with the latter,
we would even be willing to accept an equal dis-
tribution with both groups having a life expect-
ancy lower than 60 years (but more than 55 years).
(The amount of sacriﬁce of “efﬁciency” for
“equity”that we are willing to accept—in propor-
tionate terms—is the deﬁnition of the Atkinson
index of inequality
1).
The trade off between average achievement and
relative equality around the average will be
dictated by our aversion to inequality, or concern
for equality. The terms of this trade off—indeed
our aversion to inequality—may well be different
in the health space compared with the income
space. In the economic inequality literature the
trade off has been formalised by use of a param-
eter e of the social welfare function, which meas-
ures society’s aversion to inequality.
1 The value of
e varies from zero, where there is no concern for
inequality and a distribution is assessed entirely
by its (arithmetic) average value,to inﬁnity where
there is an extreme concern for inequality and the
distribution is assessed solely by its minimum
value (the so called Rawlsian case)—see Anand
and Sen.
2 As e increases, the weight in the social
welfare function on someone who is less well off
increases relative to the weight on someone who
is better off.
I want to argue that we should be more averse
to, or less tolerant of, inequalities in health than
inequalities in income. The reasons involve the
status of health as a special good, which has both
intrinsic and instrumental value. Income, on the
other hand, only has instrumental value. Health
is regarded to be critical because it directly affects
a person’s wellbeing and is a prerequisite to her
functioning as an agent.Inequalities in health are
thus closely tied to inequalities in the most basic
freedomsandopportunitiesthatpeoplecanenjoy.
In contrast, there are sometimes reasons to toler-
ate income inequalities.
There are economic reasons why we may be
willing to accept certain income inequalities.
Economists often assert—with some
justiﬁcation—that income incentives are needed
to elicit effort, skill, enterprise, and so on. These
incentives—and the resulting income
inequalities—havetheeffectofincreasingthesize
of total income (or the “cake”) from which, in
principle, the society as a whole can gain
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www.jech.com(through taxation and possibly trickle down). Thus the
increase in the size of the cake has to be balanced against the
income inequalities that must be tolerated to provide the
appropriate incentives for “efﬁciency”. Furthermore, effort,
skill, enterprise, and so on are regarded as legitimate and fair
reasons for some people to earn—perhaps even to deserve—
more than others.
But this incentive argument would not seem to apply in the
case of health. Inequalities in health do not directly provide
people with similar incentives to improve their health from
which society as a whole beneﬁts. There thus seem to be no
incentive reasons for accepting inequalities in health, other
than those that might be derivative on tolerating income
inequalities. As the empirical literature demonstrates, in-
equalities in income do produce inequalities in health—with
richer people generally having better health. I will presently
argue against tolerating inequalities in health for this derived
reason.
Our willingness to accept some inequality in general
incomes must,I believe,be tempered by what the Nobel laure-
ate James Tobin
3 called “speciﬁc egalitarianism” some 30
years ago.This is the view that certain speciﬁc goods—such as
health and the basic necessities of life—should be distributed
less unequally than people’s ability to pay for them. (Indeed, I
regard this to be a central reason why many of us are
concerned with socioeconomic gradients in health.) We are
more offended by inequalities in health, nutrition, and health
care than by inequalities in clothes, furniture, motor cars or
boats. We should somehow remove health and the necessities
of life from the prizes that serve as incentives for economic
activity, and instead let people strive and compete for
non-essential luxuries and amenities. In other words, we
would like to arrange things so that crucial goods such as
health are distributed less unequally than is general income—
or, more precisely, less unequally than the market would dis-
tribute them given an unequal income distribution. This idea
is the basis of speciﬁc—in contrast with general—
egalitarianism.
WHY IS HEALTH A SPECIAL GOOD?
The rationale for speciﬁc egalitarianism in the health space
rests on the premise that health is a special good. There is a
related notion in public economics, that of a merit good—
whose distribution, it is argued, should not be determined
according to people’s income.
That health is a special good has been recognised through
the ages. We ﬁnd this view in ancient Greek poetry, and in the
Hippocratic texts.According to the author Democrit writing in
the 5th century BC, he states in his book On Diet that:
“ (w)ithout health nothing is of any use, not money nor
anything else.”
Some 2000 years later,René Descartes
4 asserted that health
is the highest good. In Discours de la Méthode published in
1637, Descartes writes:
“... the preservation of health is ... without doubt the
first good and the foundation of all the other goods of
this life.”
The reason that health is so important is that (a) it is
directly constitutive of a person’s wellbeing,and (b) it enables
a person to function as an agent—that is, to pursue the vari-
ous goals and projects in life that she has reason to value.This
view deploys the notion of health as “well functioning”, but it
is not grounded in notions of welfare that are based on utility
or some other consequential good,such as enabling the person
to increase his or her “human capital” and hence “income”. It
is, rather, an agency centred view of a person, for whom ill
health reduces the full scope of human agency. In the termi-
nology of Amartya Sen, health contributes to a person’s basic
capability to function
5—to choose the life she has reason to
value.
If we see health in this way,then inequalities in health con-
stitute inequalities in people’s capability to function or, more
generally, in their “positive freedom” (in the language of
Isaiah Berlin
6). This is a denial of equality of opportunity,a s
impairments to health constrain what people can do or be.The
principle of “fair equality of opportunity” is one of three prin-
ciples of John Rawls’ “justice as fairness”.
7 Rawls assessed
opportunity in terms of people’s holdings of “primary
goods”—or resources such as income,wealth,and so on.In his
book Just Health Care, Norman Daniels extended the principle
to deal with fair access to health care
8 (see also Daniels et al
9
and the commentary by Anand and Peter
10). However, oppor-
tunity is best seen directly in terms of the extent of freedom
that a person actually has—that is, by one’s capability to
achieve alternative “beings” and “doings”
11—most of which
depend critically on one’s health. Moreover, the capability to
lead a long and healthy life must itself be regarded as a basic
capability, as our ability to do things typically depends on our
being alive. Thus if we apply Rawls’ “fair equality of
opportunity” principle in the space of (basic) capabilities, the
reduction of inequalities in health will follow as a direct
requirement of justice.
DIMENSIONS OF HEALTH
I have ducked any attempt to deﬁne health and do not propose
to offer a deﬁnition here.Earlier,I used a particular measure of
health, namely life expectancy in years, to illustrate the
equity-efﬁciency trade off in health.There are,of course,many
different aspects or dimensions of health and ill health,
captured by various different measures. The reasons we
adduce for disvaluing inequalities in health more than
inequalities in income will also direct us to pay more attention
to inequalities in some dimensions (measures) of health than
to inequalities in others.Thus,equality of opportunity reason-
ing may lead us to be more averse to a twofold (that is, a 2 to
1) disparity in the infant mortality rate (IMR) or the child
mortality rate (CMR) between groups than to a twofold
difference in adult or old age mortality rates. The reasoning
may also lead us to be especially concerned about disabilities
in health (physical or mental) that prevent a person being
mobile or gaining employment.
THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS
Before closing, I would like brieﬂy to address the question of
the unit of analysis of inequality—in other words, the
question of “inequality among whom?”. This is distinct from
the question we have been considering so far, which is
“inequality of what?”—income,health,or speciﬁc dimensions
of ill health.
Much of the existing empirical literature on health
inequalities—undertaken largely by epidemiologists—has
been concerned with differences in health across socioeco-
nomic groups, typically deﬁned by occupation, education, or
income.Thus,social class “gradients”have been estimated for
Britain and several other European countries. Some research-
ers have tried to understand these gradients by controlling for
factors such as smoking behaviour. Yet the gradients persist,
and much research is underway attempting to understand the
social causes and pathways that produce them.
There is much merit in analysing differences in life expect-
ancy, mortality, and morbidity among socioeconomic groups.
The classiﬁcation by groups helps to explain how they might
be generated. As tools for understanding the determinants of
486 Anand
www.jech.compopulation health, the categories should obviously be ex-
tended to include not just socioeconomic status but also gen-
der, race, and geographical location. In many developing
country contexts, these latter variables have been found to be
powerful in identifying inter-group inequalities—for example,
race in South Africa, region in China, gender in Bangladesh.
Moreover, cross classiﬁcations of socioeconomic and other
variables often provide further epidemiological clues.
Apart from explanation,there are at least two other reasons
for investigating inter-group inequalities in health. Firstly, it
allows us to identify groups that are at high risk or suffer par-
ticularly poor health. Public policy and public health policy
may thus be able to target them directly in order to improve
their health. This is the case with the United Kingdom
government’s current initiative on inequalities in health.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it allows us to
uncover those inequalities in health that we regard as particu-
larly unjust.In the language that I have been using,we will be
more averse to—or less tolerant of—certain inter-group
inequalities in health, such as racial or gender inequalities,
than to inequalities where the groups are randomly deﬁned
(saybytheﬁrstletterofaperson’ssurname).Likewise,wewill
be more averse to socioeconomic inequalities in health than to
inter-individual inequalities in health that are undifferentiated,
or unconditional on information about individuals.
Group inequalities give rise to the suspicion that they derive
from social rather than natural (for example, genetic)
factors—and may thus be avoidable through public interven-
tion. Moreover, health inequalities stratiﬁed by relevant
variables often reveal a compounding of disadvantage—to wit,
the observation of a positive correlation between (low) socio-
economic status and (poor) health. Such inequalities will
typically be less tolerable than health inequalities observed
across randomly deﬁned groups or across undifferentiated
individuals. In identifying inequity or injustice, we must take
into account—or stratify by—those categories across which
we are most averse to health inequalities.
CONCLUSION
Any approach to conceptualising and analysing inequality
must confront two fundamental questions: (1) inequality of
what?, and (2) inequality among whom?
On the what question,I have tried to argue that our aversion
to inequality in health is likely to be greater than our aversion
to inequality in income. And within different dimensions of
health, I have tried to suggest that our aversion to inequality
in some dimensions of health—such as infant and child
mortality—is likely to be higher than it is for others (namely,
those that do not constitute as serious a denial of lifetime
opportunity).
On the whom question,I have tried to suggest that our aver-
sion to inequality across certain population groups is likely to
be greater than it is across others—in particular across undif-
ferentiated individuals (who are not identiﬁed by systematic
differences in opportunity).
In all of this I have tried to adapt and extend the framework
and language of welfare economics to illuminate the study of
equity in health.
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